The IEB research group in Human Capital aims at promoting research in the Economics of Education. The main objective of this group is to foster research related to the education and training of individuals and to promote the analysis of education systems and policies from an economic perspective. Some topics are particularly relevant: Evaluation of education and training policies; monetary and non-monetary effects of education; analysis of the international assessments of the skills of the young (PISA, PIRLS, TIMMS) and adult populations (PIAAC, IALS); education and equality, considering the inclusion of the disabled in the education system; and lifelong learning. This group puts special emphasis on applied research and on work that sheds light on policy-design issues. Moreover, research focused in Spain is given special consideration. Disseminating research findings to a broader audience is also an aim of the group. This research group enjoys the support from the IEB-Foundation.
Introduction
In order for a country to grow, it has to ensure that all its citizens acquire the skills and quality of education needed to be able to compete in a modern, integrated and globalized world. Based on economic theory, having a competent education system will lead to the rise of long-run economic growth rates, since human capital investment increases labour productivity and is considered a vital input for innovation and technical progress (Lucas 1988; Romer 1990; Barro 1997 ; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004) . In the context of the African Economies, nowadays higher education is essential for economic development (Kimenyi, 2011) . Likewise, school quality and not just quantity, is crucial in shaping a country's economic growth (Hanushek and Kimko 2000; Hanushek and Woessman, 2008) . Thus, improvement in the efficiency of education is a key variable for a country's development.
It is commonly known that having a highly functioning education system is only possible in presence of a supportive institutional structure; decentralisation is a fundamental aspect of current institutional innovation throughout the world, where local autonomy has been an issue of intense debate in both developed and developing countries. Several international agencies like the World Bank, the OECD and the United Nations have been recommending decentralisation, especially in education, as an approach for development and growth, since the 1960s. Within this framework, Nechyba (2003) argues that school autonomy is expected to result in greater public school efficiency.
Plentiful empirical literature has put efforts in order to estimate the impact of government spending decentralisation on educational outcomes, where most evidence gives support to decentralised education systems as it heightens student achievement (Falch and Fischer 2012) . However, research has not given emphasis on solely decentralisation; choice as well as accountability measures are also vastly significant institutional features affecting the quality of education (Nechyba 2000; Bishop and Woessmann 2004) . Accountability systems deliver better information on student performance, and thus directly or indirectly reward students, teachers and principals for their actions. Moreover, school choice due to competition brings about a boost in school performance (Sandstrom and Bergstrom 2005; Woessmann and others 2009).
Our study examines the effects of decentralisation and school autonomy (this considers school management, ownership and funding, competition and accountability measures) on the quality of education in Jordan and Tunisia, after controlling for school factors, student and family characteristics. The data utilized in our analysis is the OECD's Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2009 database since it encompasses an adequate proxy for the quality of education, which is the students' test scores in mathematics and reading. The main contribution of this paper is being the first to examine decentralisation effects on the quality of education in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, as well as being an addition to the scarce research on school autonomy in developing countries. Furthermore, we examine our variables of interest using the most updated data (PISA 2009) in comparison to other similar studies.
The choice of Jordan and Tunisia as the focus of our study is entitled to the fact that they rank 1 st and 2 nd respectively in the MENA region according to the Human Development Index in 2007. Hence, both countries could be used as a benchmark for the rest of the region to follow.
Our findings show that decentralisation (defined as regional or local education authorities having total or partial responsibility for educational policies) has a moderate impact on the quality of education in some decision-making areas. Complete or partial decentralisation in school budget formulation and establishing student assessment policies is positively associated with student achievement in Tunisia, while complete or partial decentralisation in personnel decisions has a positive effect on student achievement in Jordan. Regarding school autonomy variables, we find that autonomy management has no significant effect on student attainment in both countries, except for a minor negative impact in Jordan. Results reveal that publically operated schools perform significantly better in Tunisia; however the type of school operation has no effect on achievement in Jordan. Private funding in all types of schools leads to a rise in students' test scores in both countries, while competition has no significant impact on student achievement, with the exception of a slight positive effect on mathematics in Jordan. Concerning the accountability variables examined, our outcomes show that comparing students' assessments to district/national performance or other schools, as well as parental pressure on schools both play an important positive role in Tunisia and Jordan. While, schools that post achievement data publicly do not lead to distinctive student test scores, except for a slight negative impact on reading literacy in Jordan.
We would like to highlight the following. First, this paper analyses a group of variables not considered in the analysis of educational systems in MENA countries (especially those referring to decentralization). Second, it employs the most updated data available enclosing information about educational autonomy and decentralization for the countries considered. Finally, the methodology used allows us to provide robust results.
We expect the results to help policy makers and government officials build more efficient education systems regarding students' achievement.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses the previous literature regarding the institutional features, which are our variables of interest. Section II provides a description of the data used in our study as well as the empirical strategy utilized. Then, results are shown in section III and a final section summarizes our conclusions.
Decentralization, autonomy and students' achievement
This section includes the institutional features that have received the utmost interest in the previous literature around the world: Decentralisation (2.1), in addition to several issues related to school autonomy such as autonomy management (2.2), ownership and funding (2.3), competition (2.3) and accountability measures (2.4). Bottani (2000) states that several countries have applied educational reforms since 1980, which principally decentralised authority from central to local level. Maslowski and others (2007) claim that educational decentralisation is often employed in hope to enhance the quality of education. Several studies like Barankay and Lockwood (2007) as well as Falch and Fischer (2012) show that decentralisation has a positive effect on education attainment. Furthermore, Faguet (2004) discovers that local governments in Bolivia retain superior knowledge of idiosyncratic educational preferences, and thus produce better outcomes. Additionally, Galiani and Schargrodsky (2002) report positive results for public education decentralisation in Argentina in the early 1990s.
Decentralisation
Most of the papers examining the impact of educational decentralisation on student outcomes (Chubb and Moe 1990; Bishop and Woessmann 2004; Fuchs and Woessmann 2007) have focused on school autonomy as a measure of decentralisation, without isolating both effects and giving particular attention to the degree of governmental involvement. One of the main contributions of our study is the isolation of both impacts on the quality of education, which is an addition to the scarce number of researchers doing so.
Autonomy management
Based on economic models of school governance, Hoxby (1999) together with Nechyba (2003) argue that an increase in autonomy is likely to result in a rise in the efficiency of public schools. Woessmann (2001) , as well as Fuchs and Woessmann (2007) show that students perform significantly better in schools that have autonomy in process and personnel decisions such as budget allocations, hiring and firing teachers, in addition to the choice of textbooks and methods of instruction. Additionally, Naper (2010) and Robin and Sprietsma (2003) show that autonomy in hiring of teachers heightens school effectiveness. Autonomy in staffing decisions also proves to positively affect students' countries over ten years to show that autonomy has a significant impact on school performance; however this impact differs depending on the country's level of development. They find that in developed countries, the impact of school autonomy in decision-making is positive, while it is oppositely negative in developing countries especially in areas related to academic content. Using a sample of eight Latin American countries, Gunnarsson and others (2009) show that school autonomy has no significant effect on school performance. Moreover, Bardhan (2002) adds that autonomous decision-making is likely to fail in developing countries due to inadequacy in experience and skills of the local officials. Using a quintile regression model, the sole paper that examines the effects of school autonomy on skills proxied by student achievement in the MENA region, shows that it has a negative effect on mathematics test scores in Jordan and Tunisia, where school autonomy is defined as pedagogical autonomy over textbooks, course content and the offered courses (Shafiq 2011) .
To sum up, the reviewed literature shows support for the positive impact of autonomy management and distribution of responsibilities between schools and administration on the quality of education. However, school autonomy does not lead to beneficial consequences in all cases. Furthermore, the effectiveness of school autonomy also depends on the country's level of development, where autonomy is more likely to be successful in developed countries, than in developing ones.
Ownership, Funding and Competition
A major institutional aspect that has been the core of evaluation of various researches is the performance of publicly operated schools versus the performance of privately Scheifer (1998) as well as Bishop and Woessmann (2004) state that economic theory is ambiguous when it comes to the impact of public versus private management in education, where some researchers claim the existence of a positive impact of private operation of schools on student performance, others indicate that the type of school has no effect on student outcomes when controlling for the socioeconomic environment and a third group states a negative effect of privately operated schools. Studies which are in favour of private schools operation include: those examining the United States like
Hanushek (1986), Neal (1997) and Opdenakker and Van Damme (2006) and those examining developing countries like Cox and Jimenez (1991) ). In addition to papers using data from PISA-2000 like Corten and Dronkers (2006) and Fuchs and Woessmann (2007) , which provide empirical support indicating an association between privately operated schools and higher student test scores. On the contrary, other studies state that subsequent to controlling for the student's socioeconomic background, the type of school operation has no effect on achievement. Those studies include Dronkers The use of market mechanism is considered to be a form of decentralisation where the promotion of more competition induces individual schools to increase student achievement due to parental demand. Woessmann and others (2009) find that when students possess a variety of schools to choose from, improved student achievement is observed. Similarly, West and Woessmann (2010) state that school systems that encompass a number of privately operated schools create alternatives for students, which as a result increase public schools performance due to private-sector competition. 
Accountability
Numerous countries have experienced a boost in accountability of local schools for student performance such as the United Kingdom's "league tables" systems and the United States' "No Child Left Behind" federal law (Hanushek and Woessmann 2011) .
The concept of accountability dates back to the second half of the twentieth century where Stiglitz (2002) as well as others showed that markets fail in absence of information. This concept is the same for the education market where better student knowledge is enhanced by adequate information on performance. Carnoy and Loeb Several countries such as England and France publish national league tables of schools on the basis of student performance on central exams, thus inducing schools to perform better. Moreover, parental involvement is also considered a method of accountability where principal-agent theory on teacher and parents argue that it reinforces schools to be self-serving and utilize funds according to parental demand and thus become more efficient (Prichett and Filmer 1999; Shafiq 2011) .
Data and Methodology
In this section, PISA data well as the variables studied are explained and the econometric strategy used in the empirical analysis is illustrated.
PISA Data
The data used in this study is extracted from the "Programme for International Student In order to empirically estimate the impacts of the decentralisation and school autonomy variables in both countries, institutional characteristics are primarily employed.
However, student performance is dependent on several other factors within and without the school system; hence those characteristics must be taken into account in order to isolate the institutional impacts. Therefore, our control variables involve students' personal characteristics, household variables, as well as school factors. The institutional factors, which are our main variables of study, are the divided into decentralisation and some variables related to autonomy, such as school management, ownership and funding, competition, and accountability (all descriptive values are shown in table 1).
Decentralisation. It is analysed through whether the regional or local education authorities have complete or shared sizeable responsibility versus the national education authority for the following tasks: hiring and firing teachers, determining teachers' salaries increases, formulating the school budget, deciding on budget allocations within the school, establishing student assessment policies and determining course content.
Decentralisation is still considered a new concept for the MENA region, thus it is more probable to witness partial decentralisation than complete decentralisation, since national education authorities still have at least shared responsibility in decisionmaking.
Autonomy management. It involves whether the principals, teachers or school governing board have considerable responsibility for the following tasks: hiring and firing teachers, determining teachers' salaries increases, formulating the school budget, deciding on budget allocations within the school, establishing student assessment policies, approving students' admission to school, choosing which textbooks are used and determining course content.
Ownership and Funding. It includes the type of the school (public or private) and the school's source of funding (whether private funding is higher than 20 per cent of total resources).
Competition. It is measured by examining whether the school has one or more schools competing for students.
Accountability. It is analysed through observing whether the assessments of students are used as a comparison to district/national performance or as a comparison to other schools, in addition to whether achievement data are posted publicly (for example in the media). Furthermore, parental pressure on schools is also included; where it is divided into two variables whether the parental pressure is a majority or a minority.
(Insert table 1 around here)
Students' personal characteristics include student age, gender, the grade level, as well as whether he lives with both his parents or not (family structure). Household variables compromise socio-economic and cultural characteristics, as well as educational resources. Regarding the socio-economic and cultural characteristics, the variables considered are the student's mother's and father's years of schooling, whether the parents are active in the labour market or not, as well as the father's occupation which is classified as follows: qualified white collar, non-qualified white collar, qualified blue collar and non-qualified blue collar. Also, a dummy variable is included taking a value of '1' if there are more than 25 books at home and a value of '0' otherwise. The educational resources consider whether the student uses a computer at home in addition to a PISA index (Home Educational Resources), which refers to whether the student has access to school resources at home such as a desk and a dictionary. School variables include school characteristics, school parental status, school policies, as well as staff-related aspects. School characteristics refer to the school location (village, town or city), the school size (total school enrolment), the class size (number of students in class), the students' composition at school (percentage of girls), as well as the percentage of repeating students and the number of computers connected to the Internet. In addition to the learning time (minutes per week) devoted to reading and mathematics, and whether the learning of students is hindered by student absenteeism.
School parental status includes the occupation, which takes the mode value of the parents' occupations at each school, as well as the school educational climate, which take the value of the average years of parents' schooling. School policies compromise several issues like the streaming of students by ability, and whether the student admission is based on: residence, academic performance, recommendation of feeder school, parents' endorsement of the instructional or religious philosophy of the school, students' interest in a special program and preference to family members of current or former students. Moreover, a dummy variable taking the value of '1' if a student would be transferred to another school because of behavioural problems, and a value of '0' otherwise, is included. Finally, staff-related aspects include whether the principal is a woman or not, the proportion of qualified teachers, the student-teacher ratio, and whether the student learning is hindered by: lack of mathematics or reading teachers, teacher shortage or a bad student-teacher relationship.
Empirical Strategy
PISA data is obtained through a two-stage stratified sampling technique. This two-step stratified sample procedure leads to nesting students at the first level with schools on the second level. Therefore, within the same class or same school, the individual measurements are not independent. This is considered a violation of independence; thus traditional regression models at student level cannot be used. Hierarchical Linear Model (HLM) has a nested structure, which permits regression coefficients to vary from one context to another (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992) . Accordingly, Hierarchical Linear Modelling (HLM) is regarded as an ideal procedure for our analysis.
Equations (1) to (4) below represent the econometric model used, where Yij is the achievement in each competence of a student 'i' in school 'j', Xkij is a vector of 'k' characteristics of student 'i' at school 'j' (or independent variables at level 1), and Zlj is a vector of 'l' characteristics of school 'j' (or independent variables at level 2). Random effects are j (at school level) and ij, (at student level). β are the estimated parameters. Equation (4) is obtained by introducing equations (2) and (3) into equation (1). Thus, in equation (4) a set of fixed effects (00, 10 Xkij, 0l Zlj) can be distinguished from a group of random effects (0j, ij). We choose not to introduce random effects in equation (3), as we are interested in estimating mean effects for the whole sample. 
Results
This section discusses our estimation results of the impact of decentralisation and school autonomy variables on the quality of education. It has to be noted that when analysing decentralisation, only public schools are considered since only these schools are relevant.
Our results are shown through four tables: Tables 2 and 3 present the results of the   HLM regressions on the mathematics and reading The ownership and funding variables prove to have a low or no significant effect on the quality of education. Being a publicly operated or a privately operated school has no effect on student attainment in any of the domains examined in our study. However, having a higher percentage of private funding leads to an improvement in student achievement in reading literacy only. (2005) give support for the positive association between competition and student performance, nonetheless our results are aligned with their finding only when it comes to mathematics test scores. A school that has one or more schools competing for its students leads to a rise of points in mathematics, but does not lead to different outcomes in reading compared to another school that experiences no competition.
Researchers like Bradley and Taylor (2002) and Sandstrom and Bergstrom
The three variables used as a measure of accountability seem to play an important role on the quality of education in Jordan where parental influence has a significant positive influence on student performance when most parents pressure the school to achieve higher academic standards. Additionally, schools that use students' assessments as a comparison to district/national performance or to other schools, cause a rise in student attainment in both mathematics and reading literacy. Posting achievement data publicly has no significant effect on student achievement in mathematics; nevertheless it reduces reading test scores.
(Insert table 4 around here)
Observing table 5, regression results regarding the impact of decentralisation on the quality of education in Jordan are shown, where the subsample containing only public schools is considered. Our findings show that decentralisation does not have a highly significant impact on the quality of education in most areas. Students who attend schools that reveal complete or partial decentralisation in either establishing student assessment policies or determining course content do not achieve significantly distinctive results than other students who are enrolled in centralised schools. However, students who are enrolled in schools that exhibit complete or partial decentralisation in the area of hiring and firing teachers and determining teachers' salaries achieve higher results in achievement exams, in comparison to other students who are enrolled in centralised schools. Results regarding the control variables, as well as the school autonomy variables do not experience considerable significant changes after introducing our decentralisation variables (available upon request).
(Insert table 5 around here)
Conclusions
It is universally acknowledged that an effective institutional structure is a crucial tool for having a highly functioning education system. Decentralisation of public services, especially educational services has been a common recommendation by several international agencies like the World Bank, the OECD and the United Nations since the 1960s, as it is considered a means for growth and development, and has been implemented by various countries around the globe. Previous research has been considerably ambiguous regarding the impact of decentralisation and school autonomy on the quality of education. Empirical studies regarding this topic are limited, especially for developing countries.
Our study is an addition to the scarce literature, where we tackle this issue by examining the effects of decentralisation and school autonomy (this considers school management, ownership and funding, competition and accountability measures) on the quality of education in Jordan and Tunisia, after controlling for school factors, student and family characteristics by using the OECD PISA 2009 database.
Our findings are somewhat aligned with the understanding that decentralisation reforms improve student achievement, yet this is revealed in limited areas of decision-making.
Complete or partial decentralisation in school budget formulation and establishing student assessment policies is positively associated with student achievement in mathematics in Tunisia, while decentralisation in personnel decisions has a positive effect on student achievement in both mathematics and reading literacy in Jordan as well as the task of hiring and firing teachers on mathematics test scores.
Regarding school autonomy variables, we find that autonomy management has no significant effect on student attainment in both countries, except for a minor negative impact in Jordan. Results on ownership reveal that publically operated schools perform significantly better in Tunisia in both mathematics and reading literacy. However the type of school operation has no effect on achievement in Jordan. In addition, private funding in all types of schools leads to a rise in students' test scores in both countries. In relation to competition, the presence of one or more schools competing in the same area has no significant impact on student achievement, with the exception of a slight positive effect on mathematics in Jordan. Concerning the accountability variables examined, our findings show that comparing students' assessments to district/national performance or other schools, as well as parental pressure on schools both play an important positive role in Tunisia and Jordan. However, schools that post achievement data publicly do not lead to distinctive student test scores, except for a slight negative impact where scores marginally decrease in reading literacy in Jordan.
To sum up, our results show some positive effects of decentralisation on student achievement. Regarding school autonomy; it appeared that when autonomy is related to the management of the centres, it has no significant impact on students' attainment. The same was observed for school competition. However, ownership (public schools) as well as percentage of private funding exposed a positive association with the quality of education. The existence of accounting systems whether related to families or schools also revealed a positive relation. Accordingly, these results are expected to be valuable and of use for policy makers and government officials when designing educational systems in aim to improve students' achievement and higher education standards, especially in the MENA region. Source: Authors' calculations. 
